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Abstract: 
Research with Keynesian-style models has emphasized the importance of the output gap for 
policies aimed at controlling inflation while declaring monetary aggregates largely irrelevant. 
Critics, however, have argued that these models need to be modified to account for observed 
money growth and inflation trends, and that monetary trends may serve as a useful cross-
check for monetary policy. We identify an important source of monetary trends in form of 
persistent central bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Simulations with historical 
output gap estimates indicate that such misperceptions may induce persistent errors in 
monetary policy and sustained trends in money growth and inflation. If interest rate 
prescriptions derived from Keynesian-style models are augmented with a cross-check against 
money-based estimates of trend inflation, inflation control is improved substantially. 
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Policy Under Uncertainty 1 Introduction
JohnTaylor’s research on monetary policyrules changed theeconomics profession’sfocus from
monetary aggregates to the interest rate as the appropriate instrument for monetary policy.1
Even the late Milton Friedman, in his last published writing, studied Taylor’s rule for interest
rate policy, though he tried to reclaim a role for money on its right-hand side.2 Recent theo-
retical advances in New-Keynesian macroeconomics building on microeconomic foundations
with monopolistic competition and price rigidity have further de-emphasized the role of money
in monetary policy. As shown by Kerr and King (1996), Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al.
(1999) optimal interest rate policy in models with price rigidities is conducted with reference
to inﬂation forecasts and output gaps but without direct concern for monetary aggregates—
not unlike Taylor’s rule.3 Some macroeconomists, however, have expressed concern about the
disappearance of money from monetary theory and policy. Lucas (2007), for example, writes:
“New-Keynesian models deﬁne monetary policy in terms of a choice of money mar-
ket rate and so make direct contact with central banking practice. Money supply
measures play no role in the estimation, testing or policy simulation of these mod-
els. A role for money in the long run is sometimes verbally acknowledged, but
the models themselves are formulated in terms of deviations from trends that are
themselves determined somewhere off stage.
1Taylor (2006) writes on his progression from money to interest rates: “Taylor (1979) showed that a ﬁxed
money growth rule - a Friedman rule - would have led to better performance than actual policy in the post World
War II period... (but)a moneygrowthrule which respondedto economicdevelopmentscoulddo evenbetter. Since
then I have found that policy rules in terms of interest rates have worked better as practical guidelines for central
banks.”
2Friedman (2006) notes at ﬁrst that he always preferred a monetary aggregate for a policy instrument but then
takes the perspective of Taylor’s rule with the federal funds rate as instrument: “The Taylor rule is an attempt to
specify the federal funds rate that will come closest to achieving the theoretically appropriate rate of monetary
growthto achieve a constantprice levelor a constantrate of inﬂation. Suppose the federalfundstargetrate is equal
to a Taylor rule that gives 100 percent weight to inﬂation deviations. That may not be the right rate to achieve
the desired inﬂation target because other variables such as output or monetary growth are not at their equilibrium
levels. On this view, additional terms in the Taylor rule would reﬂect variables relevant to choosing the right target
funds rate to achieve the desired inﬂation target.”
3The New-Keynesian model as laid out by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Goodfriend and King (1997)
and developed in detail in Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) has quickly become the principal workhorse model
in monetary economics. The case against money is perhaps made most vigorously by Woodford (2006).
1It seems likely that these models could be reformulated to give a uniﬁed account
of trends, including trends in monetary aggregates, and deviations about trend but
so far they have not been. This remains an unresolved issue on the frontier of
macroeconomic theory. Until it is resolved, monetary information should continue
to be used as a kind of add-on or cross-check.”
We address Lucas’s request for a uniﬁed account of trends and deviations, including mone-
tary aggregates, and provide a formal analysis of his proposal to use monetary information as a
cross-check for policy. The central bank’s beliefs regarding trends and deviations play a central
role in the analysis, speciﬁcally its estimates of the economy’s potential output and the implied
output gap that drives inﬂation forecasts in Keynesian-style models.
Research on optimal monetary policy design under uncertainty usually has to rely on a-
priori modeling assumptions regarding unobservable variables such as potential output (cf.
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland (2006)). These assumptions are needed to de-
termine the optimal, model-based estimates of potential output, on which policy is then condi-
tioned. Orphanides (2003) has provided an alternative approach for evaluating policies under
uncertainty that avoids these particular a-priori assumptions by using instead historical, real-
time estimates of potential output. The true value of potential output at any point in time is
assumed to be equal to the central bank’s ﬁnal estimate on the basis of information available
many years later. We use historical series of central banks’ output gap estimates for the United
States and Germany from Orphanides (2003) and Gerberding et al. (2005) respectively. Both
series indicate very persistent misperceptions regarding potential output.
Model simulations indicate that historical output gap misperceptions induce an inﬂation-
ary bias in interest rate policies that the central bank considered optimal conditional on its
model and associated forecasts. As a result, the central bank induces trends in money growth
and inﬂation even though it pursues a constant inﬂation target. Thus, as requested by Lucas,
Keynesian-stylemodelsbuilttoexplaininﬂation deviationsfrom trend areableto providean ac-
count of money growth and inﬂation trends. This ﬁnding complements recent empirical studies
that have identiﬁed proportional movements in money growth and inﬂation at low frequencies
2using a variety of ﬁlters4 and provides a structural explanation.
Next, a general deﬁnition of a policy with cross-checking that formalizes Lucas (2007)
proposal is presented. The cross-check is characterized by a ﬁrst-order condition that in-
corporates expected trend inﬂation, which is estimated from a simple monetary model. The
cross-check is triggered in a nonlinear-fashion whenever a statistical test on the basis of the
monetary model signals a trend shift. An earlier note, Beck and Wieland (2007), presented
an interest rate rule that incorporates such a shift5 and simulated a counterfactual example in
the traditional Keynesian-style model with backward-looking dynamics of Svensson (1997),
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Orphanides (2003). The present paper shows how to de-
rive an interest rate rule with cross-checking from an optimization problem and proceeds to
implement cross-checking in the benchmark New-Keynesian model.6
The advantage of the Keynesian model with backward-looking dynamics is that it ﬁts the
historical persistence in output and inﬂation and arguably embodies central bankers’ beliefs
on policy tradeoffs and monetary policy transmission in the 1970s and 1980s quite well. It
may be the better candidate for modeling central bank perceptions and describing historical
outcomes and was used for this purpose by Orphanides (2003). While the New-Keynesian
model is an unlikely description of central bank perceptions in the 1970s and 1980s, it has the
advantage of microeconomic foundations in optimal decision-making of households and ﬁrms.
Thus, it accounts for forward-looking, optimizing decision-making by market participants and
constitutes an important testing ground for policy strategies currently recommended to central
banks. For this reason, the subsequent analysis is carried out in both models in parallel.
The policy with cross-checking against money-based estimates of trend inﬂation is found
to substantially improve inﬂation control in the event of persistent policy mistakes due to his-
torical output gap misperceptions. Furthermore, monetary cross-checking remains effective in
4See Gerlach (2004), Benati (2005), Pill and Rautananen (2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
(2007).
5Beck and Wieland (2007) point out that such an interest rate rule captures key elements of the ECB’s descrip-
tion of its two-pillar policy strategy. However, the ECB has never published a formal, mathematical exposition of
its strategy.
6Our deﬁnition of monetary cross-checking is different from another interesting strategy proposed by
Christiano and Rostagno (2001) and Christiano et al. (2006) that combines monetary targeting with Taylor-style
interest rate rules.
3the event of sustained velocity shifts—the Achilles heel of traditional monetary targeting—if
standard recursive money demand estimation is applied. The nonlinear nature of interest-rate
adjustments due to cross-checking turns out to be essential. Linear policies with money-based
estimates of trend inﬂation perform substantially worse than cross-checking, whether central
bank estimates of the outputgap are correct, on average, or not. Finally, cross-checking can also
be implemented successfully using inﬂation-based estimates of trend inﬂation but money-based
estimates would dominate if money leads inﬂation as indicated by recent empirical studies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the optimal interest
rate policy under uncertainty and explains how we introduce historical central bank misper-
ceptions into the analysis. Section 3 describes the relationship between trend money growth
and trend inﬂation and shows that central bank misperceptions represent an important source
of such trends in Keynesian-style models. Section 4 introduces the general deﬁnition of cross-
checking. Section 5 applies cross-checking in the event of central bank misperceptions. Section
6 subjects the policy with cross-checking to further sensitivityanalysis and section 7 concludes.
An appendix provides further details on the models and their solution under cross-checking.7
2 Output gap misperceptions and optimal policy
Keynesian-style models of inﬂation determination assign a central role to the output gap, that is
the difference between actual output and the economy’s potential. For example, the model used
by Svensson (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Orphanides (2003) to study monetary
policy incorporates an accelerationist Phillips curve that relates current inﬂation, πt, to the gap
between current and potential output (in logs), yt −zt, lagged inﬂation, πt−1, and a cost-push
shock, ut:
πt = λ(yt −zt)+πt−1+ut (1)
The slope parameter λ determines the trade-off between output and inﬂation.
Similarly, the New-Keynesian model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Goodfriend
7Software for replicating the quantitative analysis in this paper is available from the authors upon request.
4and King (1997) that was used by Clarida et al. (1999) to study the design of monetary policy
assigns center stage to the output gap in determining deviations from steady-state inﬂation, ¯ π,
next to expected future inﬂation, πe
t+1, and cost-push shocks:
πt −π = λ(yt −zt)+β(πe
t+1−π)+ut, whereπe
t+1 = Et[πt+1] (2)
Since this Phillips curve is derived from microeconomic foundations, the parameters have a
clear economic interpretation. β refers to the discount factor of optimizing households and
ﬁrms. λ is a function of the probability that ﬁrms are allowed to adjust prices according to
Calvo (1983). Furthermore, expectations regarding future inﬂation are formed in a rational,
forward-looking manner. Potential output, zt, which is an unobservable and model-dependent
variable, corresponds to the level of output that would be realized if prices were completely
ﬂexible.8 In the following, the Keynesian-style model associated with equation (1) is referred
to as the K-Model and the New-Keynesian model associated with (2) as the NK-Model.
2.1 Optimal interest rate policy under uncertainty
Optimal policy in the above-mentioned models prescribes that the central bank conditions its
policy decisions on its best estimate of potential output. This recommendation applies even
if the central bank’s objective focuses exclusively on stabilizing inﬂation without any explicit
concern for output ﬂuctuations. The objective function of such a strictly inﬂation targeting
central bank is given by:9
−
1
2
Et

∞
∑
i=0
βi
(πt+i−π∗)2

. (3)
π∗ denotesthecentral bank’sinﬂationtarget. Inthefollowing,itisnormalizedatzeroalongwith
steady-state inﬂation, π. The rational expectation Et[.] of the objective function is conditional
8Traditional Keynesian models have typically related the measure of potential in the accelerationist Phillips
curve, equation (1), more loosely to the output implied by a standard model of long-run growth.
9Our analysis can be extended to an objective function that includes output deviations from potential and
has welfare-theoretic foundations in the New-Keynesian model. Here, we focus on strict inﬂation targeting to
emphasize that our ﬁndings regarding the consequences of output gap misperceptions do not rely on including the
gap in the objective function. Thus, we are more likely to understate than overstate their negative implications.
5on the particular model of inﬂation determination preferred by the central bank.
The optimal monetary policy that maximizes the above objective must satisfy the following
ﬁrst-order condition:10
E[πt+i|t,K/NK]=π∗ = 0 ∀i = {0,1,2,..,∞}. (4)
The output level that would achieve this optimum at time t is given by
K-Model: yt = zt −λ−1(πt−1+ut) (5)
NK-Model: yt = zt −λ−1ut (6)
Thus, the central bank aims for an output level above (or below) potential to the extent nec-
essary to offset inﬂationary pressures from cost-push shocks and—in the K-Model—inherited
inﬂation.
In practice, however, the central bank cannot observe potential output or particular shocks
with any certainty and needs to rely on estimates. We use the superscript e to refer to the
central bank’s estimates or perceptions of such unobservable variables. Thus, ze
t|t refers to the
central bank’s estimate of potential output in period t given the information available at that
point in time and ue
t|t to the cental bank’s estimate of the cost-push shock. We assume that
these perceptions represent the best available estimates of the unobservable variables from the
perspective of the central bank. Similarly, we use the superscript e as a short-hand for the
rational expectations of output and inﬂation. For example, πe
t|t = E[πt|t] represents the central
bank’s best forecast of inﬂation at the point in period t when it decides on its policy, i.e. before
it can observe the joint consequences of potential output, the cost-push shock and its policy
choice on inﬂation.
Fortunately, the optimal policy under uncertainty can be determined quite easily if the fol-
10See Svensson (1997) for the K-Model and Clarida et al. (1999) for the NK-Model. In the NK model the
question arises whether to consider the optimal policy under discretion or commitment. Note, however, that for
strict inﬂation targeting the optimal policies under discretion and commitment are identical. If output were to be
included in the loss function we would analyze optimal policy under discretion.
6lowing conditions are fulﬁlled: the model is linear, the parameters are known and uncertainty
is additive. In this case, certainty-equivalence applies, i.e. the optimal policy must satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition, equation (4), in expectation (see, for example, Svensson and Woodford
(2003) for the NK-Model and Wieland (2006) for the K-Model).11 Then, the expected optimal
output level corresponds to:
K-Model: ye
t|t = ze
t|t −λ−1(πt−1+ue
t|t) (7)
NK-Model: ye
t|t = ze
t|t −λ−1ue
t|t (8)
Theconditionsforcertainty-equivalence—linearity,knownparametersandadditiveuncertainty—
require making important a-priori assumptions regarding the processes that determine unob-
servable variables. Svensson and Woodford (2003), for example, assume that potential output,
zt, in the NK-model follows an auto-regressive process,
zt = νzt−1+εz
t, (9)
with known persistence parameter, ν, and known variance, σεz.12 Wieland (2006) makes a simi-
lar assumption regarding the natural rate in a version of the K-Model. Under these assumptions
the central bank can solve the estimation problem separately from the optimal policy problem.
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland (2006) show how to derive the optimal estimate
of potential output, ze
t|t, using the Kalman ﬁlter. Conditional on this estimate the optimal policy
implies setting the nominal interest rate, it, so as to achieve the expected output level deﬁned
by equations (7) or (8), respectively. This value of the interest rate may be inferred from the IS
11Certainty-equivalencefails if multiplicative parameters such as λ are unknown. Then, the central bank faces a
complex control and estimation problem. Examples are studied by Wieland (2000), Beck and Wieland (2002) and
Wieland (2006).
12We are referring to equation (43) in Svensson and Woodford (2003). In addition, the authors assume the
central bank observes a signal regarding potential output that is correct up to an i.i.d. normal noise term.
7equations:
K-Model: yt = yt−1−ϕ(it −πt−1)+gt (10)
NK-Model: yt = ye
t+1−ϕ

it −πe
t+1

+gt (11)
Thus, the optimal interest rate setting is given by:
K-Model: it = πt−1+(ϕλ)−1(πt−1+ue
t|t)+(ϕ)−1(yt−1−ze
t|t +ge
t|t) (12)
NK-Model: it =( ϕλ)−1(ue
t|t)+(ϕ)−1(ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t|t) (13)
This characterization of optimal interest rate policies can be simpliﬁed further by exploiting
modeling assumptions regarding the economic shocks. In particular, we assume that (gt,ut) are
i.i.d. normal with zero-mean and known variances (σg,σu). With regard to the K-Model we
follow common practice (cf. Svensson (1997), Orphanides and Wieland (2000)) and assume
that the central bank has no information on period t shocks when setting it,i . e .ge
t|t,K = 0a n d
ue
t|t,K = 0. With regard to the NK-Model we follow Clarida et al. (1999) and assume that the
central bank has some information on current shocks. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the central
bank receives a signal (ge
t,ue
t) that is correct up to an additive noise term (ε
g
t ,εu
t ) with zero
mean. Thus, ge
t|t,NK = ge
t,a n due
t|t,NK = ue
t.13
Consequently, the optimal interest rate policies correspond to:
K-Model: iK
t = πt−1+(ϕλ)−1(πt−1)+(ϕ)−1(yt−1−ze
t|t) (14)
NK-Model: iNK
t =( ϕλ)−1(ue
t)+(ϕ)−1(ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t) (15)
The optimal policy in the K-Model is a version of the famous Taylor rule, yet its coefﬁcients
on inﬂation and the output gap need not coincide with the values of 0.5 that Taylor (1993)
used to match federal funds rate choices by the FOMC from 1988 to 1993. As to the optimal
13More speciﬁcally, we assume that the true value of the demand and cost-push shocks, denoted by gt and ut
respectively, are given by gt = ge
t +ε
g
t where ε
g
t ∼ i.i.d. N

0,σεg

and ut = ue
t +εu
t where εu
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σεu).
Shocks to money demand are modeled in a similar fashion.
8policy under the NK model, Clarida et al. (1999) already pointed out that it can be interpreted
as a forward-looking Taylor rule that responds to expected inﬂation and a measure of aggregate
demand disturbance.
It is important to note that we have followed Svensson and Woodford (2003) in adopting
the assumption of symmetric information in the NK-Model. Thus, the central bank, price-
setting ﬁrms and households share the same information regarding potential output and eco-
nomic shocks and form identical expectations regarding future output and inﬂation.14
2.2 The irrelevance of monetary aggregates
So far, we have not discussed monetary aggregates because they are not needed to characterize
the transmission of interest rate changes to inﬂation in Keynesian-stylemodels. In these models
changes in the nominal interest rate inﬂuence the real interest rate due to the presence of price
rigidities; the real interest rate determines the level of output; and the gap between actual and
potential output drives inﬂation. Of course, the models may be extended to include a standard
money demand equation15 such as:
mt − pt = γyyt −γiit +st. (16)
where γy denotes the income elasticity of money demand, γi the semi-interest rate elasticity and
st an i.i.d. normal money demand shock. Whilethe central bank controls interest rates via open-
market operations that also affect the money supply, the equilibrium level of money balances
is determined recursively from the money demand equation. For this reason, money does not
14Svensson and Woodford (2004) also provide certainty-equivalence results under the assumption of asymmet-
ric information. In this case, which arises under a consistent application of the representative agent assumption,
households and ﬁrms know the true value of potential output. In our view, however, the assumption of symmetric
information is more appropriate for the policy problem at hand. In practice, individual private agents are unlikely
to know more about aggregate potential output than the central bank. If some individuals are particularly good at
estimating aggregate potential output, central banks will be eager to hire them or to buy their inﬂation forecasts.
One might even argue that it is more realistic to assume that the private sector is less knowledgeableabout macroe-
conomic aggregates. Interestingly, however, the Bundesbank’s potential output estimates that we use later on were
made public in the 1970s and 1980s consistent with our assumption of symmetry (cf. Bundesbank (1973, 1981)).
15This speciﬁcation can be derived from the optimization problem of a household that values money holdings
according to a utility function that is separable in real balances and consumption goods (see Walsh (2003)).
9appear in the optimal interest rate policies deﬁned by equations (14) and (15). The quantity of
money adjusts so as to achieve the interest rate prescribed by the optimal policy. Technically,
mt is determined by equation (16) conditional on the desired interest rate and the current values
of real income and the price level.
What about the information value of monetary aggregates? Since we treat actual output and
inﬂation as observable variables, monetary aggregates have no additional information value.
The estimate of potential output, zt|t, discussed by Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland
(2006) is obtained by means of the Kalman ﬁlter from past observations of output and inﬂation.
Monetary aggregates provide no relevant information as long as money balances do not appear
directly in the Phillips curve or the IS equation.16 In practice, initial values of GDP, the GDP
deﬂator and monetary aggregates are revised for a few quarters. While GDP is only available
on a quarterly basis, monetary aggregates are available on a monthly frequency and tend to
be revised less. Thus, monetary aggregates may provide information that helps improve initial
estimates of actual output. This information role of monetary aggregates is investigated by
Coenen et al. (2005). They show that initial GDP estimates for the euro area are revised more
substantiallythan monetary aggregates. Using an estimated model of the euro area with rational
expectations they ﬁnd that optimal estimates of current GDP assign some weight to monetary
aggregates, but this weight is very small.17
2.3 Evaluating policy performance with historical central bank misper-
ceptions
We have already pointed out that the optimal policy depends importantly on the central bank’s
estimate of potential output, zt|t. A possible route for further analysis would be to follow
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Wieland (2006) in studying policy performance using cal-
16Ireland (2004) and Andres et al. (2006) investigate the direct role of money balances in output and inﬂation
determination. They suggest that such direct effects are of minor importance.
17Coenen et al. (2005) assume that the central bankand theprivate sector havesymmetric informationand apply
the same ﬁltering techniques as in Svensson and Woodford (2003). An interesting paper by Dotsey and Hornstein
(2003) investigates this question in a calibrated model of the U.S. economy under the assumption of asymmetric
information as in Svensson and Woodford (2004). Their ﬁndings regarding the information value of money are
even more negative.
10culations that make use of a-priori assumptions concerning the unobservable process determin-
ing potential output, i.e. equation (9). Instead, we choose a different research strategy following
the inﬂuential study of Orphanides (2003). Orphanides used historical output gap estimates to
argue that the Taylorrule wouldnot havebeen able to preventthe “Great Inﬂation” of the1970s.
Orphanides (2003) collected real-time data on U.S. inﬂation and output including real-time
estimates of potential output obtained by the Council of Economic Advisers (1966-1980) and
the Federal Reserve (1980-1994).18 On this basis, we denote the difference between the real-
time estimate of potential output and the ﬁnal estimate as of 1994 as et:
et = ze
t|t −ze
t|1994 (17)
et provides a lower-bound on the extent of the central bank’s misperception of potential output
since estimates may still have been revised after 1994. Thus, Orphanides (2003) proposed to
analyze policy treating the ﬁnal estimate in 1994, ze
t|1994, as the true value of potential output,
zt:
ze
t|t = zt +et (18)
The resulting series of real-time U.S. output gap misperceptions, Et[yt −zt]−(yt −zt),i ss h o w n
by the solid line in Figure 1.
Critics have argued that the potential GDP measures constructed by the CEA were politi-
cized maximum measures not taken seriously by Federal Reserve decision makers. Therefore,
we contrast the U.S. CEA-FRB output gap misperceptions provided by Orphanides (2003) with
a similar series from Gerberding et al. (2005) for Germany from 1974 to 1999. This series is
shown by the dashed line in Figure 1. In this case, the underlying production potentials are the
Bundesbank staff’s estimates.19 The Bundesbank started to produce its own estimates of poten-
18The output gap data for the 1980s and 1990s of Orphanides (2003) was constructed from the Greenbook, the
Federal Reserve document summarizing the Board staff’s analysis of economic developments distributed to the
FOMC members a few days before each FOMC meeting. For the 1960s and 1970s Orphanides could not recover
a complete time series for potential output estimates from Federal Reserve sources but notes that discussion of
output gap measures appeared in the FOMC Memorandum of Discussion throughout this period. Thus, he uses
real-time estimates of potential output that were produced by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in those
years and available at FOMC meetings.
19The data were reconstructed from ofﬁcial Bundesbank publications and from internal documents such as the
11tial output in the early 1970s. Its methods are described in detail in Bundesbank (1973). The
Bundesbank made clear that it aimed to construct a measure consistent with price stability—not
a maximum measure.
Both series of historical output gap revisions indicate very persistent misperceptions by the
respective central bank. This persistence arises primarily from the estimates of unobservable
potential output, since revisions to actual output decline much more rapidly than those to the
output gap. Both series indicate that the production potential of these economies was over-
estimated through the 1970s and well into the 1980s. U.S. and German policy makers taking
into account these estimates were led to believe that their respective economies suffered a very
deep recession from 1974 to 1976. In retrospect, however, this period appears as a mild reces-
sion in the United States and as a decline from excessive levels towards potential in Germany.
To the extent the Federal Reserve or the Bundesbank based their inﬂation forecasts on the
output gap estimates available at the time, they must have concluded that inﬂation would soon
decline. In retrospect, such a forecast would have been wrong. Using an estimated variant of
the K-Model for the United States Orphanides (2003) showed that if interest rates had been
set according to Taylor’s rule with historical output gap estimates, inﬂation would have risen
dramatically. Thus, he concluded that Taylor’s rule would not have helped the FOMC avoid the
“Great Inﬂation” of the 1970s, as long as it believed the output gap estimates.
3 Money and inﬂation trends due to historical output gap
misperceptions
In the following, Orphanides (2003)’ ﬁndings regarding the effect of historical central bank
misperceptions on inﬂation under Taylor’s rule are shown to extend to the optimal interest rate
policies in the K- and NK-Model. Furthermore, it is shown that central bank misperceptions
constitute an important source of common trends in money growth and inﬂation similar to
the low-frequency co-movements identiﬁed by recent empirical studies. Thus, Keynesian-style
models with central bank misperceptions can provide a uniﬁed account of short-run deviations
brieﬁng material for the Council’s discussions on the monetary target for the year to come.
12from trend as well as long-run movements in money growth and inﬂation as requested by Lucas
(2007).
In a ﬁrst step, the long-run equilibrium values of money growth and inﬂation are derived.
To this end, the money demand equation (16) is re-arranged and ﬁrst-differences are taken to
obtain a short-run relationship between money growth and inﬂation:
πt = Δpt = Δmt −γyΔyt +γiΔit −Δst. (19)
Here, Δ denotes the ﬁrst-difference operator. In the long run, money demand shocks will av-
erage to zero; the nominal interest rate will converge to its constant steady-state level and its
ﬁrst-difference to zero;20 and output growth will converge to the steady-state growth rate of
potential, Δ¯ y = Δ¯ z. Thus, long-run inﬂation is proportional to long-run money growth adjusted
for trend output growth and trend velocity21 :
π = Δ ¯ m−γyΔ¯ y = ¯ µ. (20)
Recent empirical studies conﬁrm the long-run proportional relationship between inﬂation and
money growth (cf. Gerlach (2004), Benati (2005), Pill and Rautanen (2006) and Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach (2007). These studies use various types of ﬁlters. Gerlach (2004), for
example, deﬁnes ﬁltered money growth as
Δm
f
t = Δm
f
t−1+ω

Δmt −Δm
f
t−1
	
. (21)
Accordingly, we obtain a ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth from equation (20):
µ
f
t = Δm
f
t −γyΔy
f
t . (22)
20The steady state level of the nominal interest rate corresponds to the sum of the equilibrium real interest rate
and the inﬂation target.
21Speciﬁcally, with velocity deﬁned as vt ≡− mt + pt +yt and money demand determined by equation (16) the
long-run trend in velocity corresponds to Δ¯ v =( 1−γy)Δ¯ y.
13Interestingly, the empirical studies cited above report that ﬁltered measures of money growth
tend to lead ﬁltered inﬂation by several quarters. This property would render µ
f
t a particularly
useful forecast of impending movements in trend inﬂation. However, the timing assumptions of
the Keynesian-stylemodels with money demand presented in section 2, preclude such a leading
indicator role of ﬁltered money growth. This question is discussed further in section 6.
The next step is to introduce central bank misperceptions. Thus, the perceived potential out-
put, ze
t|t, in the optimal interest rate policies (equations (14) and (15)) is replaced with the histor-
ical, real-time estimates for the U.S.A. and Germany, respectively. Similarly, the true value, zt,
in the Phillips curves (equations (1) and (2)) is replaced with the ﬁnal estimates (U.S.A.: 1994,
Germany: 1999). The difference between real-time and ﬁnal estimates constitutes the output
gap misperception, et. Then, the models are simulated by drawing from the shock distributions
and parameter values positedin Table 1. Thus, a-priori assumptionsregarding thetrue structural
process driving unobservable potential (cf. equation (9)) are avoided and policy performance is
evaluated with data on historical misperceptions. It is straightforward to show that inﬂation will
inherit the persistence properties of historical output gap misperceptions:
K-Model: πt = λet +λgt +ut (23)
NK-Model: πt = λet +λε
g
t +εu
t (24)
Thus, actual inﬂation will persistently deviate from the zero inﬂation target even though the
central bank aims to offset all forecasted deviations conditional on its preferred Keynesian-style
model and associated gap estimate.
Figure 2 reports simulations with U.S. and German output gap misperceptions in the K-
model for a given draw of exogenous shocks and noise terms.22 The ﬁrst row of two panels
shows the rate of inﬂation, πt, and the ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth, µ
f
t ,w i t hU . S .
output gap misperceptions. From period 15 onwards till period 135 the difference between the
true and the perceived output gap corresponds to the difference between real-time and 1994
22The sequence of shocks is arbitrary but we obtain similar results for many alternative draws and will discuss
averages later on in this section.
14estimates from Orphanides (2003). The persistent over-estimate of potential output induces the
central bank to set interest rates too low to maintain price stability. Thus, money growth and
inﬂationincreaseandinherittheserialcorrelationofthecentralbank’smisperceptionsregarding
potentialoutput. Overtime, alsotheﬁltered measureof adjustedmoneygrowth, µ
f
t , increases as
shown in the second panel of the ﬁrst row. The lower two panels of Figure 2 report a simulation
with the Bundesbank misperceptions from Gerberding et al (2005). Again, the misperceptions
start in period 15. From then on, policy is too accommodativeand (adjusted) money growth and
inﬂation increase up to a peak of around 5 percent in spite of the central bank’s constant target
of zero inﬂation. This peak is somewhat smaller than in the case of the U.S. misperceptions
that trigger an increase up to an inﬂation rate of 6 percent. In both cases, ﬁltered money growth
provides a good mirror image of the trend movement in inﬂation.
Why does the central bank accept this sustained increase in inﬂation? The reason is that
it conducts a policy that is believed to be very effective in stabilizing inﬂation. Its forecast of
inﬂation that is based on its preferred estimate of the output gap indicates a recession. Con-
sequently, the central bank continuously predicts an imminent decline in the rate of inﬂation.
If it were to raise interest rates further its forecast would signal a worsening of the recession
and an undershooting of its inﬂation target. Ex-post, the estimation procedure that is employed
by the central bank to obtain its potential estimate, ze
t|t, attributes the persistent forecast misses
to a sequence of unfavorable shocks. Such a reconciliation of potential output estimates and
observed inﬂation performance is not without historical parallel. Many accounts of the 1970s
attribute the stagﬂation in the United States and Germany primarily to inﬂationary and reces-
sionary consequences of oil price shocks.23
We obtain similar results with the New-Keynesian model (not shown). Rather than report-
ing more individual simulations, we turn to a summary overview in Figure 3 on the basis of
averages over 1000 simulations with U.S. and German output gap misperceptions in the K- and
NK-Model, respectively. For each of the four possible combinations, we show two panels that
23Orphanides(2003)describeshowpotentialoutputestimatesfortheU.S.A.wereeventuallyreviseddownwards
following the sustained increase of inﬂation. Similarly, the Bundesbank learned from its mistakes. However, these
revisions occurred in several steps and after a substantial period of time.
15report the cross-simulation averages of inﬂation, πt, and the ﬁltered measure of adjusted money
growth, µ
f
t . A comparison of these panels indicates that ﬁltered money growth matches low-
frequency movements in inﬂation very well. Thus, the monetary model derived from the quan-
tity theory explains trend inﬂation very well. Money and inﬂation trends are due to the same
source, namely persistent central bank misperceptions with regard to potential output. These
misperceptions provide a structural explanation of the trends identiﬁed in recent empirical stud-
ies by Gerlach (2004), Benati (2005), Pill and Rautanen (2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2007). In other words, the introduction of imperfect knowledge and persistent cen-
tral bank misperceptions in Keynesian-style models is sufﬁcient to provide a uniﬁed account
of trends and deviations, including monetary trends—the unresolved issue on the frontier of
macroeconomic theory emphasized by Lucas (2007). An alternative explanation of common
trends in money growth and inﬂation would be an on-going shift in the central bank’s inﬂa-
tion target, i.e. upwards in the 1970s and downwards in the 1980s. However, there exists no
direct evidence of such a change in central bank objectives. Our explanation with a constant
inﬂation target but persistent policy mistakes offers an alternative that is grounded in empirical
observation in terms of historical output gap revisions.
4 A general deﬁnition of cross-checking
In light of the empirical evidence on concurring trends in money growth and inﬂation, Lucas
(2007)proposed to use monetary informationas an add-on or cross-check in interest rate policy.
In this section, we provide a formal interpretation of his proposal. We start by reiterating the
ﬁrst-order condition that describes the optimal policy derived under certainty-equivalence:
E[πt+i−π∗|t]=0 ∀i = {0,1,2,..,∞} (25)
It implies that trend inﬂation equals the inﬂation target in expectation. Speciﬁcally, E[πt+N|t]→
E[π] as N → ∞, and consequently:
E[π]=π∗ (26)
16Thus, a policy maker who trusts that the Keynesian-style model correctly describes the
economy, expects that trend inﬂation will turn out to match the target as long as policy is set to
stabilize expected inﬂation in every period.24
However, such conﬁdence in model-based forecasts and estimates of unobservablevariables
may be misplaced. The simulations of historical output gap misperceptions conducted in the
preceding section provide an example that sustained trend deviations from target may occur
even under policies that aim to stabilize inﬂation as close to target as seems feasible on the
basis of model forecasts. Following Lucas’s recommendation, a sceptical policy maker may
instead prefer a simpler model of trend inﬂation based on monetary information. In fact, the
preceding section offers a simple candidate model derived from the quantity equation:
E[π]=E[µf] (27)
This relationship holds in the Keynesian-style models of section 2, but would also remain valid
if the true structure of the economy were to correspond to a real business cycle model without
any price rigidities. Thus, a policy maker in the monetarist tradition, who distrusts short-run
inﬂation forecasts, may instead focus on controlling trend inﬂation. Such a monetarist policy
maker would conduct open-market operations in period t so that trend inﬂation as estimated by
the most recent observation on ﬁltered adjusted money growth is expected to equal the inﬂation
target:
E[π|µ
f
t ]=π∗ = 0 (28)
Since µ
f
t is constructed from money growth and actual output growth observations, it may be
monitored without relying on model-based estimates of potential output. As a result, the mon-
etary strategy can succeed in stabilizing trend inﬂation in spite of output gap misperceptions.25
Clearly, such a monetarist approach may appeal to a central banker who gives priority to
managing ﬁrst-order risks. In our view, however, it goes too far in abandoning any attempt at
24Similarly, a ﬂexibly inﬂationtargetingcentral bankthat aims to stabilize inﬂationand outputgapwould expect
that trend inﬂation equals the target since the trend output gap equals zero in expectation.
25Of course, a natural question concerns the implications of sustained velocity shifts for this strategy of stabiliz-
ing trend inﬂation. We return to this question in section 6.
17short-run inﬂation stabilization. After all, Keynesian-style models may not be that far off the
mark and potential output estimates need not always be utterly wrong. Instead, we follow Lucas
(2007) and investigatehow to use monetary information as a cross-check rather than as a policy
prescription that is applied in every period.
We formalize the idea of cross-checking in the following manner. In every period, the
central bank checks whether ﬁltered money growth is still consistent with attaining the inﬂation
target, or whether money growth trends have shifted, by monitoring the test statistic,
κt =
µ
f
t −π∗
σµf
, (29)
and comparing it to a critical value κcrit. Here, σµf denotes the standard deviation of the ﬁltered
money growth measure. It can be determined under the null hypothesis that the central bank’s
preferred Keynesian-style model is correct.
As long as the test statistic does not signal a sustained shift in ﬁltered money growth, the
central bank implements the optimal policy under the preferred Keynesian-style model, i.e. the
policy that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (4). Thus, in the absence of persistent output gap
misperceptions it can stabilize short-run inﬂation variations very effectively.
Once the central bank receives successive signals of a shift in trend inﬂation as estimated by
ﬁltered money growth, i.e. (κt > κcrit for N periods) or (κt < −κcrit for N periods), policy is
adjusted so as to control trend inﬂation.26 The policy with cross-checking may be characterized
with a ﬁrst-order condition that includes trend inﬂation:
E[πt|ze
t|t,K/NK]=−E[π|µ
f
k] (30)
This condition guarantees that the central bank acts to offset any signiﬁcant shift in trend in-
ﬂation as estimated on the basis of monetary information. µ
f
k denotes the most recent signiﬁcant
26The two parameters κcrit and N play different roles. κcrit reﬂects the probability that an observed deviation of
µf from π  is purely accidental (for example a 5% or 1% signiﬁcance level). N deﬁnes the number of successive
deviations in excess of this critical value. Thus, the greater N the longer the central bank waits to accumulate
evidence of a sustained policy bias.
18estimateofatrendshiftinperiodk,i. e .(κk >κcrit,..,κk−N >κcrit) or (−κk <−κcrit,..,−κk−N <
−κcrit). Following a signiﬁcant cross-check, the interest rate is set according to:
K-Model: it =( 1+(ϕλ)−1)πt−1+(ϕ)−1(yt−1−ze
t|t)+(ϕλ)−1µ
f
k (31)
NK-Model: it =( ϕλ)−1(ue
t)+(ϕ)−1(ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t)+(ϕλ)−1µ
f
k (32)
This policy implies that the expectation of period t inﬂation on the basis of the respective
Keynesian-style model corresponds to −µ
f
k as prescribed by the ﬁrst-order condition, equation
(30).27
The interest rate policy with cross-checking consists of two components,
it = i
K/NK
t +iCC
t , where iCC
t =( ϕλ)−1µ
f
k, (33)
the optimal interest rate policy conditional on the preferred Keynesian-style model and gap
estimates denoted by i
K/NK
t and the (occasional) adjustment in interest rate levels due to cross-
checking, iCC
t . iCC
t changes in a non-linear fashion whenever a new signiﬁcant trend shift in
money growth is detected.
5 Monetary cross-checking succeeds in stabilizing inﬂation
trends due to historical output gap misperceptions
We now turn to exploring the performance of interest rate policy with monetary cross-checking
asdeﬁned byequations(31)and (32). Thecross-checkingparameters, N andκcrit, arecalibrated
such that the central bank considers the likelihood that cross-checking will come into play in
the foreseeable future as negligible conditional on its preferred Keynesian-style model.28
Figures 4 and 5 report stochastic simulations of monetary cross-checking in the K- and
27The derivation for the NK model is presented in more detail in the appendix that is made available on the
ScienceDirect website.
28Given κcrit = 2.575, the 1% critical value for the normal distribution, and N = 4, the probability of a cross-
check under the null hypothesis is less than 10−8.
19NK-models. Comparing inﬂation in the top left panel of Figure 4, i.e. for the case of US mis-
perceptions in the K-Model, to theoutcomewithout cross-checking given the samedraw shocks
shown previously in Figure 2, we ﬁnd that it evolves quite differently. The sustained upward
trend observed previously is broken. The policy with cross-checking responds to an increase in
ﬁltered money growth, µ
f
t , fairly quickly after the output gap misperceptions have induced an
inﬂationary policy bias, and succeeds in reversing the inﬂation surge. The policy response is
not driven by an improved gap estimate. Rather, the central bank responds to monetary trends
over and above what is prescribed by the model-speciﬁc output-gap based inﬂation forecast.
To illustrate the interest rate adjustment from cross-checking we have added a panel that
compares the interest rate effect of the current output gap misperception, (ϕ)−1et, to the cross-
checking adjustment, iCC
t =( ϕλ)−1µ
f
k. Once the monetary test statistic κ signals a trend shift in
period k, it triggers an adjustment in the overall level of interest rates. This new level is main-
tained until the next signiﬁcant trend shift is detected. Since output gap misperceptions increase
further and continue to induce an inﬂationary policy bias the test statistic triggers two more up-
ward adjustmentsin the level of interest rates. Cross-checking also works “on the way down”as
output gap misperceptions subside and inﬂation and adjusted money growth decline below tar-
get. Consequently, monetary cross-checking triggers three successive downward adjustments.
In sum, the cross-checks, on average, offset the inﬂationary or disinﬂationary consequences of
sustained output gap misperceptions.
The lower set of three panels in Figure 4 reports the simulation with German output gap
misperceptions. Again, monetary cross-checking serves to offset the inﬂationary trends arising
from mistaken beliefs and policies. However, one large upward shift and two smallerdownward
shifts turn out to broadly match the contours of the inﬂationary bias arising from central bank
misperceptions. Figure 5 conﬁrms that cross-checking also works in the New-Keynesian model
with interest rate setting deﬁned by equation (32).
It is conﬁrmed that the above ﬁndings hold true on average by simulating 1000 draws of
shocks of 150 periods length from the respective normal distributions. The results (not shown)
indicate that cross-checking effectively reduces the duration of the policy bias arising from
20persistent output gap misperceptions. Of course, the simulations are still characterized by inﬂa-
tionary or disinﬂationary trends lasting for shorter periods. These movements serve to signal a
trend shift and trigger the interest rate adjustment due to cross-checking.
6 Three questions concerning cross-checking
In this section, the effectiveness of cross-checking is investigated in further detail. Three ques-
tions are considered, namely how to account for velocity shifts, how important is the nonlinear
nature of cross-checking and what alternative estimates of trend inﬂation may be considered.
6.1 Howwouldyouaccountforvelocityshiftsinmonetarycross-checking?
It is well-known that a strategy of strict monetary targeting would transmit variations in the
velocity of money to output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. For example, the money-demand equa-
tion (16) implies that short-run changes in money demand arise from three sources: shocks, st,
changes in interest rates, γiΔit and changes in real income, γyΔyt. While such ﬂuctuations render
a strict monetary targeting strategy undesirable, they do not inhibit monetary cross-checking as
shown in the preceding section. A more interesting question concerns the performance of mon-
etary cross-checking in the event of sustained changes in trend velocity, for example due to
ﬁnancial innovations. Two interesting examples regarding U.S. money demand have been doc-
umentedbyOrphanides and Porter (2000, 2001), and Reynard (2004).29 Orphanidesand Porter
point out that M2 velocity increased substantially in the mid 1990s. They report a sustained in-
tercept shift in their estimated velocity equation occurring over a period of several years. They
also show that this shift was identiﬁed in real time by recursive estimation techniques allowing
for intercept shifts. Such a shifting intercept may be included in the money demand equation:
mt − pt = γ0,t +γyyt −γiit +st. (34)
29Reynard (2004) notes an apparent increase in the interest-rate elasticity of money demand, i.e. γi, in the early
1970s from the perspective of time-series analysis. He emphasizes the usefulness of cross-sectional analysis for
obtaining improved estimates of the true structural parameters of money demand.
21We use the NK model to simulate a fairly dramatic shift in the intercept, γ0,t, that generates
a velocity trend of 2 percentage points for 75 periods.30 As the intercept increases, velocity de-
clines and equilibrium money growth rises to accommodate increased demand at a given level
of the interest rate. First, we assume that the central bank sticks to the original estimate of the
intercept, never re-estimates and never considers the possibility of a structural shift. The result-
ing simulation is reported in the top two panels of Figure 6. The observed, sustained increase in
money growth due to shifting velocity triggers a cross-check and thus a policy tightening. As a
result, inﬂation declines below target by 2 percentage for the duration of the downward trend in
velocity. Once velocity stabilizes, another cross-check brings inﬂation back to target.
Alternatively,we allow the central bank to recursively estimate money demand and consider
the possibilityof structural shifts.31 The resulting simulation is reported in the lower two panels
ofFigure 6. We ﬁnd that recursiveestimationcan detect the velocityshift considered and ensure
the usefulness of monetary cross-checking. This ﬁnding underscores the importance of money
demand analysis at the central bank.
6.2 Why does the cross-check take a nonlinear form rather than a linear
feedback coefﬁcient?
Cross-checking takes the form of an occasional adjustment of the model-dependent optimal
interest policiesderived from theﬁrst-order condition (4). This adjustmentis triggered in period
k when the test-statistic, κ, deﬁned by equation (29), has exceeded the critical value κcrit for N
successive periods.32 A seemingly simpler alternative would be to augment the linear interest-
rate equations with an additional linear feedback on ﬁltered money growth, µ
f
t , that applies at
30Again, this is an a-priori assumption regarding the structural process determining an unobservable variable.
In future work, we aim to collect real time estimates of money demand and velocity trends to be able to analyze
velocity trends in the same manner as output gap estimates in sections 3 and 5.
31Orphanides and Porter (2001) propose regression tree methods as a new approach to identify such shifts in
real time. Here, we consider a more traditional tool of money demand analysis in form of recursive least squares
with time-varying parameters or recursive least-squares with forgetting (see Harvey (1990), Chapter 4).
32Similarly, N successive negative realizations of κ smaller than the negative of κcrit trigger a symmetric down-
ward adjustment. Note, the counter for N is reset to zero after every signiﬁcant cross-check. The ﬁrst-order
condition, equation (30) based on µ
f
k then applies till the next adjustment is triggered.
22all times. Including such a linear feedback in the K-Model implies:
it =( 1+(ϕλ)−1)πt−1+(ϕ)−1(yt−1−ze
t|t)+(ϕλ)−1µ
f
t−1 (35)
Here, thetimesubscripton µ
f
t−1 refers to themost recent observationpriorto the policydecision
from period t −1, rather than from period k, that was the most recent period with a signiﬁcant
cross-check.
We compare the rule with linear feedback to the optimal interest rate policy conditional on
thegap estimate, equation (14), and the policy with cross-checking, equation (31). Since central
bank loss is measured by squared deviations of inﬂation from a zero inﬂation target we evaluate
policies by the simulation outcomes for E(π2). Table 2 reports the average central bank loss
over 1000 simulations under three different scenarios: no output gap misperceptions, et = 0,
U.S. output gap misperceptions, eUS
t , and German output gap misperceptions, eDE
t .
By default, the model-dependent optimal policy (equation (14)) is the best performing pol-
icy when implemented under the assumption that the central bank’s estimate of the output gap
is correct. However, the policy with cross-checking performs just as well in that scenario. Its
nonlinearity ensures that in times when the central bank’s preferred Keynesian-style model and
associated output gap estimates deliver reliable inﬂation forecasts, the model-dependent opti-
mal policy is implemented. Thus, as long as the central bank’s beliefs regarding the appropriate
macroeconomic model, the implied concept of potential output, and the appropriate estimation
method do not imply sustained misperceptions, monetary cross-checking will not trigger pol-
icy adjustments. Policy is only adjusted according to the ﬁrst-order condition (30) when the
simple monetary model of trend inﬂation, equation (27), strongly signals a trend shift. The
policy with linear feedback, however, always responds to variations in trend money growth, and
consequently causes more than twice the mean-squared error of inﬂation.
In the case of U.S. output gap misperceptions, the policy without cross-checking generates
a mean squared error of inﬂation of 5.39. The rule with linear feedback to trend money growth
responds more aggressively and improves inﬂation performance in terms of a mean squared
23error of 3.36. In this horse race, however, the policy with cross-checking again performs best
by generating a lower mean-squared error of 2.07. A similar ranking, but with smaller abso-
lute values, is obtained with German output gap misperceptions. Thus, the nonlinear policy
response implied by the occasional adjustments triggered via cross-checking promises to be a
useful approach when the central bank is uncertain about the appropriate model of the economy
and would like to revert to a simple fall-back option when outcomes persistently deviate from
model-based forecasts.
6.3 Why cross-check with money instead of other variables?
So far, the focus of the analysis has been on the two points raised by Lucas (2007), namely,
to provide an explanation of the joint trends in money growth and inﬂation observed empiri-
cally, and to develop a formal approach for cross-checking Keynesian-styleinterest rate policies
against information from monetary aggregates. However, there are other variables that may be
used as trend inﬂation estimates in cross-checking. Since central bank policy is considered to
be the source of sustained money and inﬂation trends, it is important to use variables that are
affected by policy even in the long run, that is nominal variables. Two candidates, in addition
to ﬁltered money-growth, are long-run nominal interest rates and ﬁltered measures of inﬂation
itself.
Nominal interest rates are difﬁcult to read with regard to implications for trend inﬂation
because of the interaction of the short-run negative liquidity effect and the long-run positive
Fisher effect. As to ﬁltered inﬂation, π
f
t , our analysis in section 5 suggests that it should per-
form at least as well as ﬁltered money growth, because our modeling assumptions imply that
money growth and inﬂation move contemporaneously and that money growth is more noisy
than inﬂation. Table 3 conﬁrms this conjecture with simulations of German and US output gap
misperceptions. In the K-Model, cross-checking with ﬁltered inﬂation performs about as well
as with ﬁltered money growth. In the NK-Model it performs slightly better.
However, the timing assumptions in the K- and NK-Model that are behind this result are at
odds with the recent empirical literature, which ﬁnds that money growth leads inﬂation at low
24frequencies by several quarters.33 If the timing assumptions were to be modiﬁed to replicate
this leading indicator role of money at low frequencies, ﬁltered money growth would gain a
competitive advantage over ﬁltered inﬂation as a forecast of trend inﬂation.
We also note two other reasons that would motivate a preference for cross-checking against
long-run money growth measures. First, the Keynesian-style models we use preclude direct
effects of money and credit beyond those captured by the interest rate on output and inﬂation. If
these modeling assumptions fail to hold then cross-checking with ﬁltered money growth would
be preferable to ﬁltered inﬂation. The second reason is concerned with the use of models in the
politicaldecision-makingprocess at the central bank. A central bank staffthat relies exclusively
on a Keynesian-style model and the associated output gap estimates interprets the sustained
increase in inﬂation induced by output gap misperceptions as a consequence of unfavorable
shocks. From this perspective, the staff will recommend against an additional policy response
to past ﬁltered measures of inﬂation, because it would imply forecasting a deﬂation. Policy
makers may therefore ﬁnd it preferable to request policy recommendations derived from a set of
competing models and may want to givespecial attention to monetary models of trend inﬂation.
7 Conclusions
In Keynesian-style models sustained trends in money growth and inﬂation can be explained by
successive policy mistakes due to central bank misperceptions. Using historical measures of
output gap misperceptions for the U.S. and German economies from the 1970s to the 1990s we
have provided a uniﬁed treatment of money growth and inﬂation trends along with short-run
deviations in Keynesian models as requested by Lucas (2007). This result is obtained without
relying on undocumented shifts in central bank inﬂation targets.
Central bankers today, might argue that they would not make such mistakes in estimating
potential output since they employ sophisticated ﬁltering techniques. However, this optimism
may be unfounded. Orphanides and van Norden (2002) have shown that a variety of modern
33See Gerlach (2004), Benati (2005), Pill and Rautananen (2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach
(2007).
25ﬁltering techniques lead to persistent output revisions similar to the Federal Reserve’s historical
estimates when applied to real-time data on U.S. output and inﬂation without a-priori assump-
tions. Also, central banks in the 1970s already had very sophisticated techniques at their dis-
posal. Federal Reserve researchers in the 1970s knew how to use the Kalman ﬁlter and solve
complex models (cf. Kalchbrenner and Tinsley(1977)) and economists at the Bundesbank used
fairly sophisticated production functions to calculate potential output (see the monthly reports
in October 1973 and October 1981).
Furthermore, we have provided a formal implementation of Lucas’s proposal to use mone-
tary information as an add-on or cross-check to the model-based interest rate policy. An earlier
note, Beck and Wieland (2007), posited an interest rate rule with monetary cross-checking. In
this paper, a more general deﬁnition of cross-checking has been provided by deriving such
interest rate policies from a central bank objective function and ﬁrst-order condition that incor-
porate trend inﬂation. A further innovationhas been to analyze central bank misperceptions and
cross-checking in the New-Keynesian model. Following Orphanides (2003) alternative policy
strategies under output gap uncertainty have been evaluated without a-priori assumptions re-
garding the structure of the process driving potential output by using instead historical real-time
and ﬁnal estimates of the output gap. Monetary cross-checking has been shown to substantially
improve inﬂation performance relative to the policy that would be optimal conditional on the
Keynesian model and the a-priori assumptions on potential output.
Finally, we have addressed three additional questions regarding cross-checking. Firstly,
monetary cross-checking is found to remain effective in the presence of long-lasting velocity
shifts if standard recursive estimation techniques allowing for such shifts are used in money
demand analysis. Secondly, cross-checking has been compared with a policy that incorporates
linear feedback on ﬁltered money growth. The linear feedback rule was shown to be dominated
by cross-checking whether persistent output gap misperceptions occur or not. Thirdly, ﬁltered
inﬂation is found to constitute a good alternative to ﬁltered money growth for cross-checking
as long as the timing assumptions of the benchmark Keynesian-style models hold up. If these
assumptions were modiﬁed such that money leads inﬂation as indicated by the recent empirical
26literature, ﬁltered money growth would gain an advantage over ﬁltered inﬂation. We aim to
explore the role of timing assumptions and the optimal choice of estimate of trend inﬂation in
future research.
For practical central bank policy we recommend to use the gap-based Keynesian models
of inﬂation regularly for policy design, but consider the quantity-theory based model of trend
inﬂation as a fall-back option. We suggest to implement the quantity-theory based policy rec-
ommendation in circumstances when policies based on the Keynesian models have persistently
under-performed, i.e. when trend inﬂation is better captured by the monetary models. In fu-
ture research, we aim to collect historical money demand estimates for the United States and
Germany to study whether monetary cross-checking would have helped preventing double-digit
inﬂation in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, and whether Germany escaped double-
digitinﬂation, becausetheBundesbank gavemoreweight tomonetary modelsoftrend inﬂation.
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30Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
β 0.99 Discount factor of the policy maker.
−ϕ -1 Real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand (in
line with Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
λ 0.5 Elasticity of Phillips curve w.r.t. output gap (broadly
in line with Gerlach (2004)).34
γy 0.1 Income elasticity ofmoney demand (inline withAn-
dres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
−γi -0.4 Interest rate elasticity ofmoney demand (in line with
Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
ω 0.2 Weighting parameter of ﬁlter (broadly in line in
Gerlach (2004))
¯ Δy, ¯ π,π  0 Equilibrium real interest rate, potential output
growth, steady-state inﬂation and inﬂation target
σg,σu,σs 0.8 Standard deviation of cost-push, demand and money
demand shocks
σεg,σεu 0.4 Standard deviation of noise of aggregate demand
and cost-push shocks
σεs 0.1 Standard deviation of money demand shocks
κcrit 1.96 5% critical value for the cross-checking rule.
N 4 Number of periods required for asustained deviation
in the cross-checking rule.
σµf Standard deviation of µf is not exogenous but deter-
mined consistently with model and policy
Notes: Table 1 provides an overview of the parameter values t hat we have used in our model
simulations.
31Table 2: Linear Feedback vs Nonlinear Cross-Checking
Policy Central bank loss
(K-Model)
et = 0 eUS
t eDE
t
No cross-checking 0.79 5.39 2.67
Cross-checking with µ
f
t 0.79 2.07 1.79
Linear feedback with µ
f
t 1.73 3.36 2.60
Notes: Centralbankloss correspondsto the mean squareddeviations,E[(π)2],
and is measured by averages over 1000 simulations of 150 periods length as in
Figure 3. eUS
t refers to U.S. output gap misperceptions and eDE
t to German
output gap misperceptions.
32Table 3: Filtered Money Growth vs Filtered Inﬂation
Policy Central bank loss
K-Model NK-Model
eUS
t eDE
t eUS
t eDE
t
No cross-checking 5.39 2.67 5.10 2.32
Cross-checking µ
f
t 2.07 1.79 1.85 1.57
Cross-checking π
f
t 2.06 1.75 1.72 1.50
Notes: Central bank loss correspondsto the mean squared deviations, E[(π)2],a n di s
measured by averages over 1000 simulations of 150 periods length. eUS
t refers to U.S.
output gap misperceptions and eDE
t to German output gap misperceptions.
33Figure 1: Output Gap Misperceptions in the United States and Germany
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Note: Figure 1 plots historical U.S. and German output gap misperceptions. The data for the U.S.
output gap misperceptions were provided by Orphanides (2003), the German output gap misperception
data were provided by Gerberding et al. (2005).
34Figure 2: Money Growth and Inﬂation Trends in the K-Model
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Notes: Figure 2 reports simulations with U.S. and German output gap misperceptions in the K-model
for a given draw of exogenous shocks and noise terms. The upper two panels show the inﬂation rate, π,
and the ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth, µf, with U.S. output gap misperceptions, the lower
two panels show the corresponding series with German output gap misperceptions.
35Figure 3: Money Growth and Inﬂation Trends - Averages of 1000 Draws of Shocks
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Notes: Figure 3 reports averages of 1000 simulations with U.S. and German (DE) output gap misper-
ceptions in the K- and NK-model. For each of the four possible combinations two panels are shown that
report the cross-simulation averages of the inﬂation rate, π, and the ﬁltered adjusted money growth rate,
µf.
36Figure 4: Monetary Cross-Checking in the K-Model
U.S. Output Gap Misperceptions
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German Output Gap Misperceptions
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Notes: Figure 4 reports simulations of monetary cross-checking in the K-model for U.S. (upper three
panels) and German (lower three panels) output gap misperceptions. In each case the inﬂation rate, π,t h e
ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth, µf, the output gap perception error, e, and the cross-checking
adjustment, iCC, are plotted.
37Figure 5: Monetary Cross-Checking in the NK-Model
U.S. Output Gap Misperceptions
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Notes: Figure 5 reports simulations of monetary cross-checking in the NK-model for U.S. (upper three
panels) and German (lower three panels) output gap misperceptions. In each case the inﬂation rate, π,t h e
ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth, µf, the output gap perception error, e, and the cross-checking
adjustment, iCC, are plotted.
38Figure 6: Monetary Cross-Checking and Velocity Shifts in the NK-Model
Central Bank Never Considers the Possibility of Shifts
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Notes: Figure 6 reports simulations with U.S. and German output gap misperceptions in the NK-model
for a given draw of exogenous shocks and noise terms when changes in trend velocity occur. The upper
three panels show the inﬂation rate, π, and the ﬁltered measure of adjusted money growth, µf, for the case
that the central bank sticks to the original estimate of the intercept, γ0, in the money demand equation and
never considers the possibility of a structural shift. The lower three panels plot the same series for the
case that the central bank recursively estimates money demand and considers the possibility of structural
shifts.
39A Model Equations
Table A1: Model Equations
Description Model Equation
Common equations
Central bank objective −1
2Et


∞
∑
i=0
βi
(πt+i−π∗)2

, π∗ = 0
Perceived potential ze
t|t = zt +et
Money demand mt − pt = γyyt −γiit +vt, vt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σv)
K-Model
Phillips curve πt = πt−1+λ(yt −zt)+ut, ut ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σu)
IS Curve yt = yt−1−ϕ(it −πt−1)+gt, gt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σg)
NK-Model
Phillips curve πt − ¯ π = β(πe
t+1− ¯ π)+λ(yt −zt)+ut,
ut ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σu), ¯ π = π∗ = 0
IS Curve yt = ye
t+1−ϕ

it −πe
t+1

+gt, gt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σg)
Demand signal/noise gt = ge
t +ε
g
t , ε
g
t ∼ i.i.d. N

0,σεg

Cost-push signal/noise ut = ue
t +εu
t , εu
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σεu)
Money-demand vt = ve
t +εv
t, εv
t ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σεv)
signal/noise
Notes:
Table A provides an overview of the equations, parameters and assumptions regarding the traditional Keynesian
andNew-Keynesianmodelsused in “CentralBank Misperceptionsand the Role of Moneyin InterestRates Rules”.
40B Cross-checking in the NK-Model: Detailed derivations
In the following two subsections a detailed derivation of the optimal monetary policy under
uncertainty in the NK-model without and with cross-checking is provided.
B.1. Optimal policy under uncertainty without cross-checking
We start by deriving the optimal policy under uncertainty given symmetric information be-
tween the central bank and market participants. Thus, the central bank and market participants
share the same information regarding central bank objectives, potential output estimates and
expectations regarding future inﬂation and output. In principle, the derivation is for the case of
optimal policy under discretion, but given a strictly inﬂation targeting central bank it turns out
that the policies under discretion and commitment are identical.
The policy maker’s objective under strict inﬂation targeting is to maximize the following
loss function
max−
1
2
Et

∞
∑
i=0
βi
(πt+i−π∗)2

(36)
subject to the Phillips curve and the IS curve (see Table A1). The inﬂation target is normalized
at zero, π∗ = 0. The associated ﬁrst-order condition is
E[πt+i|t]=π∗ = 0 ∀i = {0,1,2,..,∞} (37)
where πt+i depends on the output gap, yt+i −zt+i, according to the New-Keynesian Phillips
curve. It follows that the central bank and market participants expect future inﬂation to be equal
to the zero inﬂation target:
πe
t+1|t = 0 (38)
Furthermore, since we have assumed that the cost-push shocks ut are serially uncorrelated, the
expected future output gap is also equal to zero, consistent with the expected future inﬂation
rate:
xe
t+1|t = 0 ⇐⇒ ye
t+1|t = ze
t+1|t. (39)
Solving the Phillips curve for yt and applying πe
t+1|t = 0 yields the level of output compatible
with the expected inﬂation rate for period t:
ye
t|t = ze
t|t −
1
λ
ue
t|t. (40)
41UsingtheIS curve, whichcorresponds to thelog-linearversionofthehouseholdEulerequation,
yt = ye
t+1−ϕ

it −πe
t+1

+gt (41)
we can determine the optimal interest it as
it = πe
t+1|t −
1
ϕ
ye
t|t +
1
ϕ
ye
t+1|t +
1
ϕ
ge
t|t (42)
=
1
λϕ
ue
t,t +
1
ϕ

ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t|t
	
.
In the derivation of it we have made use of the above-mentioned expressions for ye
t|t, ye
t+1|t and
πe
t+1|t.
B.2 Optimal policy with cross-checking using µ
f
k as estimate of trend inﬂation
The policy with cross-checking may be characterized by a ﬁrst-order condition that includes
trend inﬂation:
E[πt|ze
t|t]=−E[π|µ
f
k] (43)
This condition guarantees that the central bank acts to offset any signiﬁcant shift in trend inﬂa-
tion as estimated on the basis of monetary information. µ
f
k denotes the most recent signiﬁcant
estimate of a trend shift. Thus, in period k the test statistic κ deﬁned by
κt =
µ
f
t −π∗
σµf
, (44)
satisﬁes the condition (κk > κcrit,..,κk−N > κcrit) or (−κk < −κcrit,..,−κk−N < −κcrit).
To determine the interest rate setting induced by a signiﬁcant cross-check in the NK model
it is important to consider the effect of cross-checking on market participants’ expectations of
future inﬂation. First, we note that conditional on the NK model and the associated estimate of
potential output neither the central bank nor market participants expect cross-checking to kick
in. Recall, that the probability that the test statistic κ exceeds the critical value is negligible,
and even more so the probability that it exceeds κcrit for N periods. Thus, in the absence of a
signiﬁcant cross-check the expectations for inﬂation in period t under the null hypothesis of the
New-Keynesian model and the potential output estimate ze
t|t are
πe
t|t = 0 (45)
Once a signiﬁcant cross-check occurs, the ﬁrst-order condition with the monetary estimate of
42trend inﬂation governs policy. As a consequence:
πe
t|t = −µ
f
k (46)
Thus, under symmetric information the central bank and market participants will expect current
inﬂation–conditional on the New-Keynesian model and potential output estimate–to fall below
the target by the extent of the trend inﬂation estimate provided by ﬁltered money growth.
To solve the New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the expected output level that the central
bank should aim at according to the policy with cross-checking, it is necessary to characterize
market participants’ expectation of inﬂation in period t +1. In the baseline case it is assumed
that market participants expect future inﬂation to return to the zero inﬂation target of the central
bank, i.e. πe
t+1|t = 0. This assumption is standard for the optimal policy under discretion.
It implies that the central bank cannot manipulate market participants’ inﬂation expectations
by promising to commit to delivering future inﬂation outcomes different from the objective
function with its long-run target.
Next, the Phillips curve is solved for the level of output that the central bank expects to
achieve in period t, ye
t|t.U s i n gπe
t+1|t = 0a n dπe
t|t = −µk
f one obtains
ye
t|t = ze
t|t +
1
λ
πe
t|t −
β
λ
πe
t+1|t −
1
λ
ue
t|t ⇐⇒ (47)
ye
t|t = ze
t|t −
1
λ
ue
t|t −
1
λ
µk
f.
In the next step, the IS curve is solved for the interest rate it that achieves the expected optimal
levelofoutput, that is, thelevelof outputconsistentwiththe central bank’s ﬁrst-order condition.
To this end, it is necessary to characterize market participants’ expectation of output in period
t +1. Consistent with the expectation that inﬂation will be equal to the target in period t +1,
market participants expect output to be equal to potential output in period t +1:
ye
t+1|t = ze
t+1|t. (48)
Solving the IS equation for it given the expressions for ye
t|t, ye
t+1|t and πe
t+1|t yields the interest
rate policy with cross-checking:
it = 0−
1
ϕ

ze
t|t −
1
λ
ue
t|t −
1
λ
µk
f


+
1
ϕ
ze
t+1|t +
1
ϕ
ge
t|t (49)
=
1
λϕ
ue
t|t +
1
ϕ

ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t|t
	
+
1
λϕ
µk
f.
For the sake of completeness, we have also investigated the policy with cross-checking
43under the assumption that the central bank is able to credibly commit to maintaining the disin-
ﬂationary stance implied by the policy with cross-checking for a ﬁnite number of periods, T,
in the future. In this case, the central bank is able to inﬂuence future inﬂation expectations s.t.
πT|t = πT−1|t = .. = πt|t = −µ
f
k. Thus, future inﬂation expectations move in a way that will
help offsetting the apparent increase in trend inﬂation. The implied expected path of output and
interest rates can be solved for recursively by starting in period T +2 and solving backwards
for expected inﬂation, output and interest rates. The interest rate level expected for period T
coincides with the expectation of equation (49):
iT|t =
1
ϕ

ze
T+1|t −ze
T|t
	
+
1
λϕ
µk
f. (50)
The interest rate level set in period t, however, incorporates the response of market participants
expectation of future inﬂation to the central bank’s announcement of the policy with cross-
checking:
it =
1
λϕ
ue
t|t +
1
ϕ
(ze
t+1|t −ze
t|t +ge
t|t)−µ
f
k. (51)
We have simulated this policy under historical U.S. and German output gap misperceptions in
the New-Keynesian model. The simulation results are similar to the baseline case discussed
in the paper concerning the success of cross-checking in offsetting the inﬂationary bias due to
persistent central bank misperceptions. Of course, due to the response of inﬂation expectations
to the announcement of cross-checking, the particular interest rate path followed by the central
bank differs from the baseline case.
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